My argument throughout is simple: The conspiratorial exercise to erase muktijuddher chetona the guiding spirit of the Liberation War of from the heart of Bangladesh was planted during the war and within the shortest time possible, the vanguards of muktijuddher chetona were eliminated one by one — the assassination of the Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Jail Killings, the murders of Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, Major ATM Haider and Colonel Huda, the judicial murders of Colonel Taher and summary executions of many sepoys were all part of the conspiratorial exercise of the anti-Liberation forces.
These conspiracies are still continuing till today — including the recent attacks on the Buddhist temples of Ramu and Ukhiya. I argue that some of the identified enemies of were left unaccounted for and absorbed into the state machinery after independence. Our first point of reference is an event from early April — the late freedom fighter Colonel Shafayet Jamil subsequently, a key personality of the November 3 coup of while on his way to Brahmanbaria met Taheruddin Thakur at a place near the Sylhet highway.
I have nothing to do with you. Who told you to revolt? Upon hearing this, Shafayet Jamil left without continuing the conversation.
It is unsurprising kracner Taheruddin Thakur reacted the way he did. Colonel Taher would briefly refer to MNAs and MPs of the likes of Thakur in his prophetic letter of resignation addressed to Bangabandhu in September, on how they desired provincial autonomy rather than all out freedom.
After the formation of the Mujibnagar government in mid-AprilThakur would be appointed as a member of a Special Cell of the newly formed Krache Ministry and the infamous Mahbub Alam Chashi would be appointed Foreign Secretary Mukul, During the Liberation War ofthe evil nexus led by Mushtaq through American diplomatic channels attempted to strike a compromise with the Pakistani Military junta and uphold the krwcher of Pakistan by forming a Confederation Lifschultz, ; Miah, As the saying goes, old habits die hard — Mushtaq-Chashi-Thakur also formed the trio of principle civilian conspirators of the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib on August 15, Furthermore, Mushtaq was denied the right to represent Bangladesh at the U.
General Assembly in New York and was subsequently removed from the post of Foreign Minister immediately following independence and assigned a minor portfolio op. Similarly, Chashi had already been removed from service in November, Hossain, Unfortunately when it came to identifying ones true friends and rebuilding Bangladesh kravher the lines of a uniform policy adherent to the spirit ofthe Bangabandhu government faltered. The late Wajed Miah, eminent scientist and son-in-law to Sheikh Mujib offered his recollection of a meeting on January 10,the day Bangabandhu returned from Pakistani captivity.
I was present as well. They informed Bangabadhu of the ideologies and roles of the Sector Colonfl entrusted with different colojel of the Mukti Bahini. These men under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib had formed the historic nucleus fighting for independent Bangladesh in the early s. Although the contents of the briefing are yet to be disclosed, it is known for sure that the relationship between Sheikh Moni and Tajuddin from the days of the war was unfortunately a sour one.
There is reason to suspect that the seeds of the distancing between Bangabandhu and Tajuddin were planted during the meeting mentioned above. In the weeks that followed, Mushtaq was granted a new life line after being incorporated into the new Bangabandhu cabinet.
One such instance is reflected in the recollections of freedom fighter Major Nasir Krachef another key personality of the November 3 coup of Hakim was not only serving as the head of the Bangladesh Transit Camp but was also the chief of the Military Police force.
This is the same Captain Hakim who had fought against us during the nine months of our Liberation War. The shells he fired had resulted in the krcaher of hundreds and hundreds of refugees and freedom fighters. After shaking hands kraxher him I became engulfed in extreme grief and shame. I went to the bathroom to wash my hands. My inner soul wanted to revolt.
I felt like protesting at the top of my voice. The late Major Shafayet Jamil faced a similar situation after independence in On his arrival at the headquarters of the Bangladesh Army, Shafayet colonell Lt.
Colonel Feroze Salauddin and found him krachef be a close aide to Osmany. I did not even feel like looking at this Lt. Colonel who had once licked the boots of the Pakistan Army.
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A few days after I returned to Sylhet I got a telephone call from Osmany. He demanded an explanation as to why I did not salute Colonel Salauddin. Osmany threatened to court martial me for my offence. Colonel Salauddin would have a bright military career in independent Bangladesh! Another similar incident unfolded when it came to the appointment of the first Adjutant General of the Bangladesh Army.
Kracher Kornel by Shahaduzzaman
However when Taher returned to an independent Bangladesh in April following treatment of his kraher leg and learned that he would have to serve under Masud who had directly collaborated with the Pakistan Army duringhe strongly protested Kracuer Hossain, Other controversial decisions of Osmany included the krachher of Lt. Al Farid and Lt. Modabber into the police forces Uddin, All the above named had collaborated directly with the Pakistan Army during op. It is evident from the above incidents that Osmany is to be greatly blamed for the rehabilitation of anti-Liberation officers into the newly independent Bangladesh establishment.
It goes without saying that such decisions were severely antagonistic to the spirit of Whatever adequately trained solders or officers we had were concentrated in regular force units.
Independent units of freedom fighters were deprived of obtaining necessary military skills and leadership. Kracer was due to the fact that the commanders of the Liberation Forces had no concept whatsoever of a Liberation struggle. Their only concern was to raise regular main force brigades to consolidate their own power [here, Taher is speaking in reference to the formation of the K, S and Z Forces].
They said an army of 20 divisions would be raised in due course. The coponel fighters were carrying out acts of heroism inside the country, but there was no one to inspire them. An effective farsighted leadership could have spontaneously developed inside the country, had there been no external interference.
Had the two brigades of trained troops, one at Agartala under Khaled Mussaraf and the other at Meghalaya under Major Zia, been correctly deployed, we could have raised 20 divisions of peasant fighters within seven or eight months within the country. My ideas deeply annoyed Colonel Osmany. For him it was a very easy life. He had a safe shelter to sleep in and a great deal of time to move around inspecting sector headquarters. But it was a parody of a Liberation War.
The leadership was simply insane. This was not understood by Colonfl Osmany. It is not correct to attempt to raise a regular force at an early stage of guerrilla struggle. His thoughts on this issue deserve the attention of future researchers looking into the growth of guerilla warfare.
It can be concluded on the note that had Osmany reformed and molded the Bangladesh Army in light of muktijuddher chetonait would not have become a haven of conspiracy and events like August 15 would probably not have seen the light of day.
It is to be noted that Colonel Taher, Colonel Ziauddin and Major Jalil, all colone army officers who had valiantly folonel inwere all for ideological reasons forced to severe ties with the Bangladesh Army by the end coloonel Their departure is important and ironic because it was Taher and Ziauddin who foiled the first coup attempts against the Bangabandhu government.
I then thought I should postpone my tour till the return of the Prime Minister. Far from taking any action against the conspirators, the Chief of the Cklonel Staff [Major-General KM Shafiullah] has told me to relinquish the command of 44th brigade and take the responsibility of D. I feel that the conspiracy is still going on and many others are associated with that. This type of usurpation of power goes, in general, against the hopes and krachef of the people and it must be stopped.
If no action is taken against the persons associated with the conspiracy, then the goodwill of the army will be sullied and in that case it is not possible on my part to work in the kracber.
I took part in the liberation struggle not as an colonrl of the Pakistan army but as a freedom fighter. I think that is very prestigious for me. The interest of the people is supreme to me.
I want to go back to the people after leaving the army. During those conversations Ziauddin would speak of things his brigade officers had never heard before. As a result within the shortest period of time, officers of the cantonment were seen to be enriched with socialist thoughts. Taher was a step ahead of Ziauddin. As Commander of the 44 th Brigade at Comilla, Taher plunged into implementing socialist ideals into the operations of his brigade.
My officers complied with my orders and I had a set of officers whose consciences were completely clear. This is what I regarded as leadership.
I always sought to appeal to what was good in men. I detested and avoided taking advantage of the weakness of an individual or of our nation. I constantly tried to develop a strong army based on those who had fought for freedom.
We ploughed our own fields, grew our own food, and went to the villages to join in production. This was the path to self-reliance. It is sad that Taher and Ziauddin, the very first men to have resisted two conspiracies against the Bangabandhu government inmen who had upheld and implemented the socialist ideals in the newly formed Bangladesh Army, were among the first to have been cornered and looked upon with suspicion by the then regime. This is discussed in detail later on in the article.
After victory was achieved, the estimated 1,45, freedom fighters who had taken part in the Liberation War were suddenly asked to surrender their arms and return to the lives they led prior to March 26, Uddin, Scanty number freedom fighters were inducted into the newly formed Rakkhi Bahini.
This created new confusions because it was perceived as a challenge to the regular Army. One such option could have been the absorption of freedom fighters into the Bangladesh Army or the civil administration. Yet ironically, while on the one hand freedom fighters were sidelined, the estimated 1, officers and 25, soldiers who were repatriated from Pakistan to Bangladesh in were taken into the Bangladesh Army with arms wide open giving birth to yet another contradiction op.
While being confined in the military camps many of these persons offered their full cooperation to the Pakistanis. In fact General Zia would largely depend on them in order to consolidate his power within the Army after November 7, The officers who had not taken part in the War, had found a new ally in Zia after the killing of Mujib and removal of Moshtaque. They needed eachother in order to survive both as a class and a force in the civil-military structure of the country.
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